On Liberty and Utilitarianism 论自由与功利主义 [平装] pdf epub mobi txt 电子书 下载 2025

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John Stuart Mill（约翰·斯图尔特·米尔） 著

图书标签:

• 约翰·斯图尔特·密尔
• 自由主义
• 功利主义
• 政治哲学
• 伦理学
• 古典哲学
• 社会思想
• 西方哲学
• 平装本
• 思想史

出版社： Random House

ISBN：9780553214147

版次：1

商品编码：19017151

包装：平装

丛书名： Bantam Classics

出版时间：1993-01-01

页数：272

正文语种：英文

商品尺寸：10.67x1.52x17.78cm

编辑推荐

These two essays by John Stuart Mill, England's greatest nineteenth-century philosopher, are the fruit of six hundred years of progressive thought about individual rights and the responsibilities of society. Together they provide the moral and theoretical justification for liberal democracy as we know it, and their incalculable influence on modern history testifies not only to the force of their arguments, but also to the power ideas can have over human affairs.

内容简介

Together these two essays mark the philosophic cornerstone of democratic morality and represent a thought-provoking search for the true balance between the rights of the individual and the power of the state. Thoroughly schooled in the principles of the utilitarian movement founded by Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill nevertheless brings his own unique intellectual energy to issues such as individual freedom, equality, authority, happiness, justice, and virtue.

On Liberty is Mill's famous examination of the nature of individuality and its crucial role in any social system that expects to remain creative and vital. Utilitarianism brilliantly expounds a pragmatic ethic based on one controversial proposition: actions are right only if they promote the common good and wrong if they do not. While much of Mill's thinking was eventually adopted by socialists, it is in today's democratic societies—with their troubling issues of crime, freedom of speech, and the boundaries of personal liberty—that his work resounds most powerfully.

作者简介

John Stuart Mill was a child of radicalism, born in 1806 into a rarefied realm of philosophic discourse. His father, who with Jeremy Bentham was a founding member of the utilitarian movement, was responsible for his son's education and saw to it that he was trained in the classics at an extraordinarily early age. In 1823 Mill gave up a career in law to become a clerk at the East India Company, where his father worked. Like his father, he rose to the position of chief examiner, which he held until he retired from the company in 1858.

While still in his teens, Mill began publishing articles and essays in various publications and became an editor of the London and Westminster Review, in 1835. In 1843 he published System of Logic, followed by Principles of Political Economy in 1848. Other important works include On Liberty (1859), Utilitarianism (1863), The Subjection of Women (written 1861, published 1869), and Autobiography (published posthumously in 1873).

Mill married Harriet Hardy Taylor in 1851, and her influence on his thinking and writing has been widely cited. The couple worked together on On Liberty, and the essay is dedicated to her memory–she died in 1858. After serving as a member of Parliament from 1865, to 1868, Mill retired to France and died at Avignon in 1873.

It took scholars several decades before they fully examined John Stuart Mill's unique and systematic contributions to ethical and logical traditions. For today's students of economics, philosophy, and politics he remains a vibrant and preeminent figure.

精彩书评

"A wonderful edition... "
-- Irving Louis Horowitz, Rutgers University

"Alexander should be commended for making this invaluable material accessible to scholars and students... "
-- Maria H. Moralies, Florida State University

"An impressively compact and engaging introduction and a well-chosen selection of ancillary materials..."
-- Eileen Gillooly, Columbia University

"The introduction offers fresh insights... "
--Thomas Christiano, University of Arizona

精彩书摘

Chapter One

Introduction

THE SUBJECT of this Essay is not the so-called Liberty of the Will, so unfortunately opposed to the misnamed doctrine of Philosophical Necessity; but Civil, or Social Liberty: the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual. A question seldom stated, and hardly ever discussed, in general terms, but which profoundly influences the practical controversies of the age by its latent presence, and is likely soon to make itself recognized as the vital question of the future. It is so far from being new, that, in a certain sense, it has divided mankind, almost from the remotest ages; but in the stage of progress into which the more civilized portions of the species have now entered, it presents itself under new conditions, and requires a different and more fundamental treatment.

The struggle between Liberty and Authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of history with which we are earliest familiar, particularly in that of Greece, Rome, and England. But in old times this contest was between subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the Government. By liberty, was meant protection against the tyranny of the political rulers. The rulers were conceived (except in some of the popular governments of Greece) as in a necessarily antagonistic position to the people whom they ruled. They consisted of a governing One, or a governing tribe or caste, who derived their authority from inheritance or conquest, who, at all events, did not hold it at the pleasure of the governed, and whose supremacy men did not venture, perhaps did not desire, to contest, whatever precautions might be taken against its oppressive exercise. Their power was regarded as necessary, but also as highly dangerous; as a weapon which they would attempt to use against their subjects, no less than against external enemies. To prevent the weaker members of the community from being preyed upon by innumerable vultures, it was needful that there should be an animal of prey stronger than the rest, commissioned to keep them down. But as the king of the vultures would be no less bent upon preying on the flock than any of the minor harpies, it was indispensable to be in a perpetual attitude of defence against his beak and claws. The aim, therefore, of patriots was to set limits to the power which the ruler should be suffered to exercise over the community; and this limitation was what they meant by liberty. It was attempted in two ways. First, by obtaining a recognition of certain immunities, called political liberties or rights, which it was to be regarded as a breach of duty in the ruler to infringe, and which, if he did infringe, specific resistance, or general rebellion, was held to be justifiable. A second, and generally a later expedient, was the establishment of constitutional checks, by which the consent of the community, or of a body of some sort, supposed to represent its interests, was made a necessary condition to some of the more important acts of the governing power. To the first of these modes of limitation, the ruling power, in most European countries, was compelled, more or less, to submit. It was not so with the second; and, to attain this, or when already in some degree possessed, to attain it more completely, became everywhere the principal object of the lovers of liberty. And so long as mankind were content to combat one enemy by another, and to be ruled by a master, on condition of being guaranteed more or less efficaciously against his tyranny, they did not carry their aspirations beyond this point.

A time, however, came, in the progress of human affairs, when men ceased to think it a necessity of nature that their governors should be an independent power, opposed in interest to themselves. It appeared to them much better that the various magistrates of the State should be their tenants or delegates, revocable at their pleasure. In that way alone, it seemed, could they have complete security that the powers of government would never be abused to their disadvantage. By degrees this new demand for elective and temporary rulers became the prominent object of the exertions of the popular party, wherever any such party existed; and superseded, to a considerable extent, the previous efforts to limit the power of rulers. As the struggle proceeded for making the ruling power emanate from the periodical choice of the ruled, some persons began to think that too much importance had been attached to the limitation of the power itself. That (it might seem) was a resource against rulers whose interests were habitually opposed to those of the people. What was now wanted was, that the rulers should be identified with the people; that their interest and will should be the interest and will of the nation. The nation did not need to be protected against its own will. There was no fear of its tyrannizing over itself. Let the rulers be effectually responsible to it, promptly removable by it, and it could afford to trust them with power of which it could itself dictate the use to be made. Their power was but the nation's own power, concentrated, and in a form convenient for exercise. This mode of thought, or rather perhaps of feeling, was common among the last generation of European liberalism, in the Continental section of which it still apparently predominates. Those who admit any limit to what a government may do, except in the case of such governments as they think ought not to exist, stand out as brilliant exceptions among the political thinkers of the Continent. A similar tone of sentiment might by this time have been prevalent in our own country, if the circumstances which for a time encouraged it, had continued unaltered.

But, in political and philosophical theories, as well as in persons, success discloses faults and infirmities which failure might have concealed from observation. The notion, that the people have no need to limit their power over themselves, might seem axiomatic, when popular government was a thing only dreamed about, or read of as having existed at some distant period of the past. Neither was that notion necessarily disturbed by such temporary aberrations as those of the French Revolution, the worst of which were the work of a usurping few, and which, in any case, belonged, not to the permanent working of popular institutions, but to a sudden and convulsive outbreak against monarchical and aristocratic despotism. In time, however, a democratic republic came to occupy a large portion of the earth's surface, and made itself felt as one of the most powerful members of the community of nations; and elective and responsible government became subject to the observations and criticisms which wait upon a great existing fact. It was now perceived that such phrases as 'self-government', and 'the power of the people over themselves', do not express the true state of the case. The 'people' who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and the 'self-government' spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority; the people, consequently, may desire to oppress a part of their number; and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of power. The limitation, therefore, of the power of government over individuals loses none of its importance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community, that is, to the strongest party therein. This view of things, recommending itself equally to the intelligence of thinkers and to the inclination of those important classes in European society to whose real or supposed interests democracy is adverse, has had no difficulty in establishing itself; and in political speculations 'the tyranny of the majority' is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard.

Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant-society collectively, over the separate individuals who compose it-its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism.

But though this proposition is not likely to be contested in general terms, the practical question, where to place the limit-how to make the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control-is a subject on which nearly everything remains to be done. All that makes existence valuable to any one, depends on the enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people. Some rul...

现代社会思潮的交汇：从古典自由主义到当代伦理困境 本书并非《论自由与功利主义》的续篇或评论，而是深入探讨影响现代政治哲学、伦理学和法律实践的两大核心思想传统——古典自由主义与功利主义——在当代语境下的复杂互动、内在张力与演化路径的综合性研究。 我们将目光投向一个更广阔的思想图景，考察这些理论如何塑造了我们对个人权利、社会正义、国家职能以及道德选择的理解。 本书旨在提供一种跨越学科界限的视角，审视自启蒙运动以来，西方思想界如何在“个人自主性”与“最大化集体福祉”这两种看似矛盾的价值之间进行艰难的权衡。我们不会聚焦于特定文本的细致解读，而是着重于这些思想范式的宏观结构及其在当代社会面临的严峻挑战。 第一部分：古典自由主义的遗产与重塑 本部分追溯了以洛克、密尔（在此非指功利主义的密尔，而是其早年思想的铺垫）、孟德斯鸠等人为代表的古典自由主义基石，并分析了其如何在二十世纪演变为不同流派，以应对工业化、全球化和福利国家的兴起。 一、自由的界限与消极自由的困境： 古典自由主义的核心在于对国家权力的限制，强调消极自由（Freedom From）——免于强制和干涉的自由。我们首先考察了其理论基础，特别是关于自然权利和财产权的论述。然而，随着社会财富分配不均日益加剧，仅凭“不干涉”是否足以保障真正的个人能动性成为一个核心议题。本章将探讨新自由主义（如哈耶克和诺齐克）如何试图在继承古典自由主义衣钵的同时，回应早期自由主义者对贫困和不平等的关注不足的问题。我们将深入分析“最小国家”的理念在应对复杂社会风险（如环境危机、跨国金融波动）时的局限性。 二、从私人领域到公共领域：权利的扩张与冲突： 自由主义的演进表明，“自由”的概念正在从纯粹的消极权利向积极权利（Positive Rights，如受教育权、医疗权）扩展。这种转变不可避免地引入了对资源再分配的必要性。本书将分析，这种积极权利的纳入，如何在不损害核心的个体自主性的前提下，被整合进自由主义的框架内。我们探讨了“言论自由”在数字时代所面临的新的挑战：信息泛滥、算法偏见以及“仇恨言论”的界定问题，这些都要求我们重新审视古典自由主义者对于公共理性和市场交换的信念。 三、契约论的重访：代议制与程序正义： 我们考察了霍布斯、洛克到卢梭之间的社会契约论传统，并将其置于现代代议制民主的背景下。重点分析了罗尔斯（尽管其理论深受功利主义的批判和启发，但其核心框架属于修正的自由主义）的“无知之幕”如何试图为社会基本结构的公平性提供一个超越经验主义的辩护。本书将讨论程序正义在多文化社会中的有效性，以及当不同群体对“正义”的理解存在根本分歧时，程序本身是否还能维系社会共识。 第二部分：功利主义的逻辑与当代应用的挑战 本部分将从边沁和密尔的奠基性工作出发，探讨功利主义作为一种后果论伦理学，如何提供了一种看似简洁而普适的决策工具，并分析其在现代公共政策制定中的广泛应用，以及由此引发的深刻伦理困境。 一、量化幸福的尝试与回报递减： 功利主义的核心在于“最大化整体幸福”（Utility Maximization）。本书将详细分析早期功利主义者如何尝试建立一种“幸福的算术”——对快乐和痛苦进行测量和比较。我们考察了密尔试图引入“质的差异”来回应“猪的快乐不等于人的快乐”这一经典批评，并讨论了这种区别在实际操作中如何回归到某种精英主义的判断。现代福利经济学和成本效益分析（Cost-Benefit Analysis）正是这种量化思维的直接产物。 二、群体利益与个体牺牲：功利主义的“暴政”风险： 功利主义在面对资源稀缺和紧急情况时，其决策的效率优势显而易见。然而，它对个体权利的潜在漠视构成了最核心的挑战。本书将通过一系列思想实验（如器官移植悖论、电车难题的现代变体）来剖析，当“多数人的最大利益”要求牺牲少数人的基本权利时，功利主义的逻辑必然导向何种结果。我们将探讨，现代功利主义者如何试图通过引入“规则功利主义”来规避“行为功利主义”的道德风险，即建立旨在最大化长期整体效用的规则体系。 三、风险评估、环境伦理与代际公平： 在处理气候变化、大规模流行病等涉及未来数代人福祉的复杂问题时，功利主义的贴现率（Discount Rate）成为一个关键的伦理争论点。如何衡量遥远未来的利益？本书将分析不同功利主义流派在处理代际公平问题上的差异，以及如何将非人类实体的利益（如动物福利、生态系统价值）纳入效用计算的尝试。这要求我们超越传统的人类中心主义框架，重新定义“利益相关者”。 第三部分：两大范式的张力与融合的可能 本书的最后部分超越了对单一思想的阐释，转向探究自由主义与功利主义在当代政治哲学的核心议题上如何相互渗透、相互制约。 一、权利与效率的永恒角力： 我们审视了在医疗资源分配、刑罚设定、以及公共安全监控等领域，自由主义对不可侵犯权利的坚持（如“我们不能为了救五个人而牺牲一个无辜者”）与功利主义对整体社会效益的追求之间所产生的制度性冲突。本书将分析，现代宪政民主制度本身就是一种在两者之间寻求动态平衡的尝试。 二、程序、后果与德性： 古典自由主义倾向于强调程序的正当性（过程的公平性），而功利主义则彻底关注结果的优劣（后果的效用）。本书认为，要构建一个既尊重个体尊严又力求社会公正的现代伦理体系，必须引入第三种视角——德性伦理（Virtue Ethics）。我们将探讨，一种基于“关怀伦理”或“社群主义”的视角，如何能调和程序与后果之间的鸿沟，例如，通过强调公民的美德（如责任感、同情心）来内化对整体福祉的关注，从而减少对外部强制和纯粹理性计算的依赖。 三、超越二元对立的整合趋势： 最后，本书将展望未来。在面对人工智能的崛起、基因编辑等前沿技术带来的伦理难题时，单一的自由主义或功利主义框架似乎都显得捉襟见肘。我们探讨了“负责任的创新”理念，它要求政策制定者在推进技术进步的同时，必须建立起多层次的道德约束机制，这些机制往往是自由主义对权利的坚持与功利主义对风险评估的审慎结合的产物。 本书试图为读者提供一个清晰的路线图，理解我们今天所处的伦理和政治环境，是如何由过去两百年来关于“什么是好社会”和“什么是正当行为”的深刻辩论塑造而成的。它不是对任何既有立场的简单支持，而是一次对我们共同的道德和政治遗产的批判性梳理。

评分☆☆☆☆☆

这本书简直就是思想的盛宴！它以一种我从未想过的方式，将两个看似对立的哲学概念——“自由”与“功利主义”——巧妙地融合在一起，进行了一场深刻而细致的辩论。作者的论证过程严谨且富有逻辑性，一步步地带领读者深入探索这两个概念的核心。读这本书的过程，就像是在与一位智者进行一场激烈的思想交锋，每一次的论证都充满了启发。我尤其欣赏作者在处理复杂哲学问题时的清晰和易懂，即使是一些非常抽象的概念，也能被他解释得生动形象，仿佛就在眼前。这种将深奥理论转化为易于理解的语言的能力，实在令人赞叹。我迫不及待地想看到，这本书是如何在维护个体自由的同时，又兼顾到最大多数人的最大幸福的。

评分☆☆☆☆☆

这本书的内容，我只能说，它超越了我原本的预期。它所探讨的议题，对于当今社会依然具有极其重要的现实意义。作者对“自由”的界定，以及对“功利主义”的分析，都充满了前瞻性和深刻性。我感觉到，这本书不仅仅是停留在理论层面，更是将这些哲学思想与现实生活紧密地联系起来，让我们能够更好地理解我们所处的社会，以及我们应该如何在这个社会中生活。我尤其欣赏作者在提出观点时的客观和公正，他没有回避任何一个具有争议性的方面，而是用一种理性的方式，引导我们去思考。我相信，这本书将会成为我书架上的一本常读之书，并在未来的日子里，不断地给予我启发和指引。

评分☆☆☆☆☆

这本书就像一个引人入胜的迷宫，每一个章节都充满了挑战与惊喜。我感觉自己仿佛置身于一个思想的舞台，作者是那个巧妙的导演，而我则是那个被他引导着去探索、去思考的观众。他提出的每一个问题，都让我陷入沉思，每一个论点，都引发我更深层次的思考。我特别喜欢他在探讨“自由”的边界时所提出的那些尖锐的问题，以及在论述“功利主义”的局限性时所展现出的细腻洞察。这本书让我重新审视了自己对于自由和幸福的理解，也让我开始思考，如何在个人选择与社会责任之间找到一个平衡点。我确信，读完这本书，我的思维方式将会发生深刻的改变。

评分☆☆☆☆☆

这本书的封面设计非常吸引人，简洁却又不失庄重，那种经典的感觉扑面而来，让人忍不住想要深入其中。拿到手里，它的质感也相当不错，纸张的厚度适中，翻阅起来手感舒适，这一点对于我这样喜欢长时间捧书阅读的人来说，是非常重要的考量。而且，书的排版也很讲究，字体大小适中，行距合理，即使是长时间阅读，眼睛也不会感到疲劳。我一直对那些能够引发深度思考的书籍充满好奇，而《论自由与功利主义》这个书名，本身就带着一种引人入胜的哲学魅力。它暗示着一场关于个体权利与群体福祉之间复杂关系的探讨，我预感这本书将是一次挑战我固有认知、拓展我思想边界的旅程。我尤其期待它能为我提供新的视角来理解社会运作的深层逻辑，以及我们在其中扮演的角色。

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这本书的语言风格独树一帜，带着一种古老而优雅的韵味。它不是那种快餐式的通俗读物，而是需要你静下心来，慢慢品味，细细咀嚼。作者的文字功底深厚，字里行间都透露着智慧的光芒。我喜欢他那种不疾不徐的叙述方式，仿佛每一句话都经过了深思熟虑，每一个词语都恰到好处。阅读的过程，就像是在聆听一位饱学之士娓娓道来，既能感受到思想的深度，又能体验到语言的美感。我特别注意到，作者在阐述一些关键观点时，会引用大量的历史事实和哲学典故，这使得他的论证更加有力，也让整个阅读体验更加丰富。我感觉，这本书不仅仅是一部哲学著作，更是一件艺术品。

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还没看，包装不错，无损坏，不错。

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另一方面，密尔从知识增长和人类真理的发生机制上，认为个人自由是最高效保证知识增长的必要保证。为了保证真理为大众所接受，密尔甚至认为保持一定的反面与错误意见也是必要的。“一旦战场上没有敌手，教师和学者就会在他们的职位上沉睡。”他认为正是在与异议的辩驳于争论过程当中，才能够更有力和充分地让真理脱颖而出。 密尔对西方自由主义思潮影响甚广，尤其是其名著《论自由》，更被誉为自由主义的集大成之作，同时也与弥尔顿的《论出版自由》一道，被视为报刊出版自由理论的经典文献。这部著作的要义可以概括为：只要不涉及他人的利害，个人（成人）就有完全的行动自由，其他人和社会都不得干涉；只有当自己的言行危害他人利益时，个人才应接受社会的强制性惩罚。这就是密尔所划定的个人与社会的权利界限，所以，1903年当严复第一次把《论自由》介绍到中国来时，书名就叫《群己权界论》。《论自由》的第二章专门探讨了言论自由问题，标题就叫《论思想自由和讨论自由》，这部分论述对报刊自由主义影响最大。 密尔的经典之作《论自由》被认为是对十九世纪维多利亚社会中弥漫着的强制性道德主义的反抗。

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导言不错，书不错，发货有点慢

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学习和了解下外国人眼中的自由

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书小，价格对中国老百姓来说确实有点高了

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定不到货，这样做会流失很多京东客户！！！

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这么便宜的价格(26块)，很值

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全英文版本，不知道是不是原版

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终于如愿以偿买到了这本书