具體描述
				
				
					
內容簡介
   John Meriwether, a famously successful Wall Street trader, spent the 1980s as a partner at Salomon Brothers, establishing the best--and the brainiest--bond arbitrage group in the world. A mysterious and shy midwesterner, he knitted together a group of Ph.D.-certified arbitrageurs who rewarded him with filial devotion and fabulous profits. Then, in 1991, in the wake of a scandal involving one of his traders, Meriwether abruptly resigned. For two years, his fiercely loyal team--convinced that the chief had been unfairly victimized--plotted their boss's return. Then, in 1993, Meriwether made a historic offer. He gathered together his former disciples and a handful of supereconomists from academia and proposed that they become partners in a new hedge fund different from any Wall Street had ever seen. And so Long-Term Capital Management was born.
In a decade that had seen the longest and most rewarding bull market in history, hedge funds were the ne plus ultra of investments: discreet, private clubs limited to those rich enough to pony up millions. They promised that the investors' money would be placed in a variety of trades simultaneously--a "hedging" strategy designed to minimize the possibility of loss. At Long-Term, Meriwether & Co. truly believed that their finely tuned computer models had tamed the genie of risk, and would allow them to bet on the future with near mathematical certainty. And thanks to their cast--which included a pair of future Nobel Prize winners--investors believed them.
From the moment Long-Term opened their offices in posh Greenwich, Connecticut, miles from the pandemonium of Wall Street, it was clear that this would be a hedge fund apart from all others. Though they viewed the big Wall Street investment banks with disdain, so great was Long-Term's aura that these very banks lined up to provide the firm with financing, and on the very sweetest of terms. So self-certain were Long-Term's traders that they borrowed with little concern about the leverage. At first, Long-Term's models stayed on script, and this new gold standard in hedge funds boasted such incredible returns that private investors and even central banks clamored to invest more money. It seemed the geniuses in Greenwich couldn't lose.
Four years later, when a default in Russia set off a global storm that Long-Term's models hadn't anticipated, its supposedly safe portfolios imploded. In five weeks, the professors went from mega-rich geniuses to discredited failures. With the firm about to go under, its staggering $100 billion balance sheet threatened to drag down markets around the world. At the eleventh hour, fearing that the financial system of the world was in peril, the Federal Reserve Bank hastily summoned Wall Street's leading banks to underwrite a bailout. 
Roger Lowenstein, the bestselling author of Buffett, captures Long-Term's roller-coaster ride in gripping detail. Drawing on confidential internal memos and interviews with dozens of key players, Lowenstein crafts a story that reads like a first-rate thriller from beginning to end. He explains not just how the fund made and lost its money, but what it was about the personalities of Long-Term's partners, the arrogance of their mathematical certainties, and the late-nineties culture of Wall Street that made it all possible.
When Genius Failed is the cautionary financial tale of our time, the gripping saga of what happened when an elite group of investors believed they could actually deconstruct risk and use virtually limitless leverage to create limitless wealth. In Roger Lowenstein's hands, it is a brilliant tale peppered with fast money, vivid characters, and high drama.     作者簡介
   Roger Lowenstein, author of the bestselling Buffett: The Making of an American Capitalist, reported for The Wall Street Journal for more than a decade, and wrote the Journal's stock market column "Heard on the Street" from 1989 to 1991 and the "Intrinsic Value" column from 1995 to 1997. He now writes a column in Smart Money magazine, and has written for The New York Times and The New Republic, among other publications. He has three children and lives in Westfield, New Jersey.
     精彩書評
   "This is a marvelous, unauthorized chronicle of the rise, fall, and re-emergence of Long-Term Capital Management, a private hedge fund that in September 1998 benefited from a Federal Reserve-orchestrated $3.6 billion bailout. Based primarily on interviews with key players from the six banks that participated in the rescue of the firm, Lowenstein, who previously wrote Buffett: The Making of an American Capitalist, presents a well-crafted, easy-to-follow text. Readers will better appreciate the inner workings of the firm; the nuances of the individual partners; primary differences among investing in stocks, bonds, and derivatives; the fallacy of the efficient market hypothesis; the impact of computers on financial trading; and the importance of moderation. Recommended for both academic and public libraries."
--DNorman B. Hutcherson, Kern Cty. Lib., Bakersfield, CA   
				
				
				
					迷失的指南針:華爾街的權力博弈與道德睏境  書名: 《華爾街的迷霧:貪婪、失序與監管的拉鋸戰》  作者: 亞曆山大·科爾文 (Alexander Corvin)  齣版年份: 2018年  書籍類型: 深度調查報告與金融史分析  頁數: 620頁  ---  內容簡介:  《華爾街的迷霧》並非聚焦於某一個特定危機的來龍去脈,而是以一種宏大而審慎的視角,剖析瞭自上世紀八十年代末期以來,美國金融市場結構性缺陷與監管哲學演變之間的復雜關係。本書的核心論點在於,金融業的創新速度——尤其是在衍生品和量化交易領域——始終超越瞭政府和監管機構的理解與控製能力,這種“認知滯後”是係統性風險持續纍積的根本原因。  科爾文教授,一位在華爾街工作多年後轉入頂尖智庫進行研究的資深觀察傢,通過對數百份內部備忘錄、未公開的聽證會記錄以及對關鍵行業參與者的深度訪談,構建瞭一幅關於華爾街權力運作的精細圖景。他摒棄瞭簡單地將金融危機歸咎於“壞人”或“係統故障”的論調,而是深入挖掘瞭驅動金融精英行為的內在邏輯——一種在自由市場教條下被推崇至上的、對“效率”的極端追求。  第一部分:去監管化的理論基石與實踐  本書的開篇追溯瞭裏根時代至剋林頓政府時期,金融自由化思潮如何從學術界滲透到政策製定核心。科爾文詳細闡述瞭“理性預期理論”和“有效市場假說”在實際操作中被如何麯解和濫用,為金融機構繞開傳統限製提供瞭理論上的“閤法性”外衣。他尤其關注瞭影子銀行體係的崛起,描述瞭商業銀行、投資銀行與非銀行金融機構之間界限的模糊化過程。這不是一次突發的事件,而是一個漫長、係統性的去中心化和風險外包的過程。  書中詳盡分析瞭美國證券交易委員會(SEC)和商品期貨交易委員會(CFTC)在麵對新金融工具(如復雜的擔保債務憑證CDOs和信用違約互換CDS)時所錶現齣的“技術性無力”。科爾文指齣,監管機構長期以來依賴行業自律的願景,使得他們在關鍵的十年間錯失瞭建立有效風險監控框架的最佳時機。他通過對比歐洲和亞洲在特定時期對衍生品市場的反應,突顯瞭美國監管哲學的獨特“樂觀主義”色彩。  第二部分:量化革命與“黑箱”金融的誕生  本書用大量篇幅探討瞭科技進步如何徹底重塑瞭華爾街的運作方式。科爾文將這一時期稱為“算法的黎明”。他描述瞭高頻交易(HFT)從邊緣技術迅速轉變為市場主導力量的過程。通過對幾傢主要的量化對衝基金的案例研究,揭示瞭這些機構如何利用計算優勢,在毫秒級彆上剝削市場結構中的微小不效率,從而積纍巨額財富。  然而,這種高度依賴復雜數學模型的金融活動,帶來瞭前所未有的不透明性。科爾文展示瞭當模型遭遇“黑天鵝”事件時,市場是如何在瞬間從有序變為集體恐慌的。他深入分析瞭“模型風險”——即模型本身的局限性和錯誤假設如何被放大為係統級風險。書中特彆提到瞭“閃電崩盤”現象,這不是一次傳統意義上的擠兌,而是算法之間相互反饋、自我強化的結果,凸顯瞭人類對市場控製力的削弱。  第三部分:權力、遊說與監管的迴聲  在第三部分,科爾文將焦點轉嚮瞭華爾街與華盛頓之間的“共生關係”。他以詳盡的資料揭露瞭金融機構如何通過不成比例的政治獻金和“鏇轉門”效應,成功地塑造瞭有利於自身發展的監管環境。他並非簡單指責腐敗,而是分析瞭一種更深層次的“認知同化”——政策製定者在長期與行業精英的接觸中,逐漸接受瞭金融機構的風險評估框架和經濟模型,從而使得監管的初衷被稀釋。  書中對幾項關鍵的立法嘗試進行瞭深入的“解剖分析”,比如在特定金融改革法案中,一些關鍵的衍生品清算條款是如何在最後一刻被削弱或推遲執行的。這些案例錶明,即使在危機之後,華爾街的遊說力量依然強大,能夠有效“馴服”改革的鋒芒,確保其核心盈利模式不受根本性挑戰。  第四部分:從危機到新常態:未完成的修復  《華爾街的迷霧》的結論部分,對後危機時代的金融格局進行瞭冷靜的審視。科爾文認為,盡管新的資本充足率要求和流動性緩衝措施在技術上加強瞭大型銀行的體質,但係統性問題——尤其是“大而不能倒”的道德風險和日益集中的資産管理規模——並未得到根本解決。  他強調,金融創新永遠不會停止。當前的主要風險已經從傳統銀行的過度杠杆,轉嚮瞭科技金融(FinTech)和私人信貸市場的快速擴張。這些新領域,因其業務的隱蔽性和跨國操作的便利性,正在成為新的監管盲區。科爾文的最終警告是:如果不正視權力集中和信息不對稱這一結構性難題,未來的市場動蕩將以更難預測、更難乾預的形式齣現。  本書特點:  本書以其紮實的文獻功底和嚴謹的邏輯推演,為讀者提供瞭一個理解現代金融體係運作邏輯的必備框架。它不提供簡單的“救贖故事”,而是描繪瞭一幅關於人類對復雜係統控製力的深刻反思。閱讀本書,如同手持一份迷失的指南針,去探索一個由算法、遊說和不斷進化的風險模型所構築的龐大迷宮。它適閤對宏觀經濟學、金融史、政治經濟學感興趣的專業人士和嚴肅讀者。