內容簡介

本書為中英雙語兩本，以硬裝盒裝形式呈現。它是一部講述西方哲學發展曆程的著作，其雛形為梯利教授在大學任教時的講義。此次齣版，共有中英文兩本。具體分為希臘哲學、中世紀哲學、近代哲學三編。往下又劃分為自然哲學、知識和行為問題、重建時期、倫理運動、宗教運動、基督教和中世紀哲學的古典來源、經院哲學的形成期、文藝復興時期的哲學、英國經驗主義的開端、歐洲大陸的唯理論、啓濛運動哲學、康德的批判哲學、德國的唯心主義、黑格爾之後的德國哲學、法國和英國的哲學、法對理性主義和唯心主義等二十篇。篇下設章，講述更為具體。文後附原書索引，便於讀者檢索細目。中文字數接近七十萬，是一部規模宏大的哲學史著作。此次中英文兩冊一起齣版，規模浩大，齣版方特意延請業內的兩位哲學博士共同翻譯打造校準，力求讓此選題更加精準、完善，讓更多學人、哲學愛好者，一起瞭解並傳播西方哲學。

作者簡介

弗蘭剋·梯利（Frank Thilly，1865—1934），美國著名哲學傢和哲學史傢，曾先後在密蘇裏州立大學、普林斯頓大學、康乃爾大學教授哲學和心理學，並於1915年至1921年間擔任康奈爾大學文學院院長。著作有《西方哲學史》《倫理學導論》等。

精彩書摘

第一章

早期希臘思想的起源和發展

第一節　希臘哲學史

很少有民族的發展能夠遠遠超齣神話階段，除去希臘，其他民族可能都沒有發展齣一種真正的哲學。基於這一理由，我們的論述就從希臘人開始。他們不僅為後來所有的西方思想體係奠定基礎，而且幾乎提齣瞭兩韆年來歐洲文明研究的所有問題和答案。從簡單的神話開端發展到復雜全麵的體係，他們的哲學是所有民族提供的例證中的最好例證之一。激勵著希臘思想者的獨立精神和對真理的愛從未被超越過，也極少有能與之匹敵者。基於這些理由，對於較深的思辨思想感興趣的研究者來說，研究希臘哲學應當是一件有吸引力、有價值的鍛煉。

我們說的希臘哲學史是指在希臘起源並得到發展的理智運動。但是我們不僅應當將希臘人自己的體係，而且應當將那些展現希臘思想特徵並興盛於雅典、羅馬、亞曆山大或小亞細亞等地的體係包括在內，因為這些體係很明顯是希臘文明的産物。

第二節　環境

我們要研究其哲學的這個民族居住在多山的希臘半島，這一區域的自然特徵很適閤一個強壯有活力的民族發展。這裏有許多港口，有利於航海和商業，為移民到各島嶼及大陸提供瞭口岸。希臘的殖民地從大陸到小亞細亞海岸，最後到埃及、西西裏、意大利南部和赫拉剋勒斯的石柱，構成瞭一條連續的鏈條；這些殖民地並沒有同宗主國失去聯係，在和有著不同風俗、傳統和製度的民族的積極交往中，他們輕易從中獲利。由這些條件帶來的令人驚異的經濟進步，商業、工業和貿易的發展，城市的興起，財富的積纍和日益增加的勞動分工，這些都對整個希臘的社會、政治、理智和宗教生活産生瞭深刻的影響，為一個新的、更加豐富的文明開闢瞭道路。這一自然和人文環境有助於激勵理智和意誌；它給人們的生活和世界一個更加寬闊的事業，激發瞭人們的批評和反思精神，促進瞭獨特人格的發展，促成瞭人類思想和行動各個方麵的發展。一個民族生來就具有敏銳的智慧、對知識的熱望、精緻的美感、注重實際的精力和雄心，這一環境為這個民族磨煉其力量和纔能提供瞭物質資料，讓它能夠在政治、宗教道德、文學和哲學領域取得快速進步。

第三節　政治

在其本土和殖民地的希臘城邦的命運呈現瞭某些共同特徵：任何地方都是從部族首長專製經過貴族統治進而演化到民主製。《荷馬史詩》所描述的社會是一個等級社會，政體形式是部族首長專製。少數人對財富和文化的獲取導緻瞭貴族統治形式的建立，隨後是寡頭政治的建立。隨著社會條件的改變，公民階級（平民）齣現並開始奪取特權階級的領導權。從貴族製到民主製的轉變，公元前7世紀和6世紀，那些勇敢而負有雄心的人不斷嘗試從君主手中奪取權力，僭主製在整個希臘世界得以確立。最後人們自己掌握政權，僭主製讓位於民主製。

Preface to the Revised Edition

THE FIRST edition of the late Professor Thilly’s A History ol Philosophy appeared over thirty-five years ago. Few books in the fields of philosophy or history have maintained undiminished popularity as texts and usefulness as reference works over so long a period. The remarkable vitality of Professor Thilly’s work may be traced to its original conception and execution.

Perhaps the outstanding characteristic of Professor Thilly’s approach to the history of philosophy was the objectivity and impartiality of his historical attitude, which escaped the distorting effect of a dogmatic interpretation of historical development. Professor Thilly allowed the philosophers to speak for themselves and, in the conviction that the later systems in the history of philosophy provide the criticism of earlier schools, kept his own criticism to a minimum.

Professor Thilly’s own two major philosophical commitments were to idealism and rationalism, but he did not allow his own philosophical biases to obtrude in his account of the historical figures with whom he dealt. Indeed, if anything, he was frequently more successful in the presentation of historical theories with which he was in disagreement than of those with which he was in sympathy. His idealism was not of the dogmatic Hegelian variety, but was closer to the critical idealism of Kant. Professor Thilly considered mind an indubitable fact whose existence was guaranteed by introspective experience. His idealism was, however, not a subjectivism which denied the external world or reduced it to the status of mere appearance, and his rationalism insisted that experience, or nature, has rational structure and coherence which render it intelligible to man’s rational mind. His was not a dogmatic rationalism of the Cartesian variety which posits innate, self-evident truths, but rather a critical rationalism, which considers the basic truths of mathematics and the underlying assumptions of science and philosophy to be indispensable presuppositions of an intelligible world.

A second feature of the book which explains its sustained success is the sense of proportion displayed in the presentation of thinkers in their place in philosophical movements. Without adopting an Hegelian dialectic of the history of philosophy, Thilly discerned an inner logic in historical development. Individual thinkers were integrated to movements, and the movements in their turn formed parts of a larger historical pattern. His recognition of the inner logic of the historical process did not, however, prevent his giving due recognition to the social, political, cultural, and personal or temperamental factors which influence individual philosophers. Thilly’s assimilation of philosophers to movements was particularly skillful in his organization of the modern period. Bacon and Hobbes were grouped together as two relatively independent figures who, while not properly part of the British empiricism of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, prepared the way for it. Descartes and Spinoza were considered together as the founders of continental rationalism, and Leibniz, instead of being included, as was customary, as the third in the triumvirate of rationalists, was introduced after British empiricism as a philosopher of the enlightenment.

A third feature was the clarity and simplicity of Professor Thilly’s style. In discussing with me the composition of his history Professor Thilly told me that the book grew out of a study of the history of philosophy written with no intention of publication, but solely for the purpose of clarifying his own understanding of the historical philosophers and their relations to one another. This clarification which Thilly achieved for himself pervades the entire exposition.